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ARGUMENT 
I. THE BELLS' OFFSET CLAIM LACKS EVIDENTIARY FOUNDATION, AND IS 
BARRED AS A MATTER OF LAW BY THE BELLS' FAILURE TO NOTIFY 
STONECREEK OF THE ALLEGED DEFICIENCIES AND TO GIVE IT AN 
OPPORTUNITY TO CURE. 
The evidence at trial does not support the award of any offset to the Bells. The 
Bells' claim that Cottonwood Landscaping repaired deficiencies with Stonecreek's work 
for which they are entitled to an offset lacks foundation. In addition, the evidence 
establishes that the Bells never notified Stonecreek of any problems with its work and 
never requested that Stonecreek remedy any deficient work, replace plants, or repair 
equipment under the warranty. 
A. Dan Cloward of Cottonwood Landscaping Had No Personal 
Knowledge of the Work Stonecreek was to Perform and Could Not 
Testify as to What Work Cottonwood Landscaping Remedied or as to 
Its Value. 
In their opposition to Stonecreek's Cross-Appeal, the Bells claim that the 
testimony of Cottonwood Landscaping representative Dan Cloward supports the trial 
court's offset because he "clearly outlines his familiarity" with Stonecreek's bid and was 
aware of deficiencies in its work. (Bells' Br. at 7). On cross-examination, however, Mr. 
Cloward admitted, inter alia: 1) he did not know the condition of the Bells' property (the 
"Property") when Stonecreek begin its work; 2) he did not know how much time had 
passed between the completion of Stonecreek's work and the start of Cottonwood's work; 
3) he did not know the parties' course of dealings on the job or why Stonecreek 
ultimately left the job; 4) he did not know if the plants that Cottonwood transplanted had 
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been placed in their original locations at the Bells9 choice and request; 5) he did not know 
which plants Stonecreek had planted or where, or who chose to place certain plantings in 
particular locations; and 6) a certain amount of plantings die in every new landscaping 
job. (R. at 405: 189-191, 194, 194,201,217-18). Additionally, when asked if he could 
estimate how much Cottonwood would have bid to do all the landscaping work that 
Stonecreek had done, Mr. Cloward testified that it "would be very difficult" to answer 
because he did not know the size or quantity of plants, including tress, shrubs, and 
perennials, that the Bells chose for Stonecreek to use; and he did not know "what 
condition that job was at when they started...." (R. at 405: 216-17). Mr. Cloward stated: 
I didn't go through before we started and count how many shrubs and 
perennials and trees were there. So I don't know what was there or what they 
provided. All I know is things that we replaced that were dead. So it's hard 
for me to quantify. I don't think I could even give a guess at that without 
having an exact bid in front of me of them saying this is how many trees we 
were contracted for, how many shrubs, how many perennials, all these things. 
This is how the job looked like with pictures showing me such and it could 
swing 100 percent on price. 
(R. at 405: 217-18). 
Simply put, Mr. Cloward's own testimony establishes that he did not have any 
foundation on which to make any judgment about what work Stonecreek purportedly was 
to have performed, nor about whether Cottonwood's work remedied a decision or choice 
of the Bells as opposed to any alleged deficient work attributable to Stonecreek. Mr. 
Cloward did not know what caused the death of the plantings that Cottonwood replaced, 
and the plantings could have died for any number of reasons (as he admitted they do on 
every landscaping job) completely unrelated to Stonecreek and for which Stonecreek has 
no liability whatsoever. Since the Bells' entire offset argument is based on Mr. 
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Cloward's testimony that the work Cottonwood performed was to "remedy" deficient 
work by Stonecreek, but Mr. Cloward admittedly lacked the necessary foundation to 
testify as to the work performed by Stonecreek, the Bells' offset claim fails because there 
is no evidence or foundation to support it. 
This lack of foundation is compounded by the fact that at trial the court made no 
finding of facts as to 1) the cause of the death of the replaced trees or the cause of 
discoloration of replaced sod; 2) the reason why certain plants that were moved by 
Cottonwood were originally placed where they were (i.e., whether the Bells chose and 
requested the original locations); or 3) whether the sprinkler and water feature work 
performed by Cottonwood was to remedy any defects, or whether it was simply part of 
normal, periodic maintenance or upkeep. The case of Provo City Corporation v. Nielson 
Scott Co., 603 P.2d 803 (Utah 1979), is therefore highly instructive. In Provo City, the 
Utah Supreme Court refused to imply a duty requiring a landscape architect to replace 
trees that died where the cause of death was unknown, explaining: 
It is significant that no finding of fact was made as to the cause of the death 
of the trees, which might have been the effect of an unusually harsh winter, 
the failure of the city to water the trees during the winter, a defect in the trees 
themselves, or a number of other possible causes.... 
Except for the fact that they failed to survive the winter, there was no 
evidence presented to the court that the replacement trees were unhealthy or 
defective when planted.... 
The evidence does not establish, nor did the lower court find, that [the 
contractor] had breached his contractual duty to provide sound plants.... 
Id. at 805-06. 
In holding that the Bells were entitled to an offset in the case at bar, the trial court 
concluded that $7,000 worth of the work performed by Cottonwood "was to repair 
deficiencies with the Work and to complete the Contract." (R. at 366-67). But as in 
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Provo City, the Bells' evidence did not establish, nor did the trial court make any specific 
findings of fact regarding, what work was allegedly defective or incomplete and the cause 
of the claimed problems. This Court should therefore reverse the $7,000 offset awarded 
to the Bells. 
B. The Bells are Not Entitled to Any Offset as a Matter of Law Because 
They Did Not Notify Stonecreek of Any Alleged Deficiencies and Did 
Not Give Stonecreek an Opportunity to Fix Them. 
Even if Cottonwood's work was done to remedy alleged deficiencies (which 
Stonecreek denies and which the evidence does not support, as shown above), the Bells 
are barred as a matter of law from any offset claim by their failure to provide Stonecreek 
timely notice of the claimed deficiencies and an opportunity to cure them. The trial court 
found that the parties' contract included a one-year warranty on workmanship and plants. 
(R. at 364). The trial court further found a breach of that contractual warranty and 
awarded an offset to the Bells. (R. at 370). That ruling was in error, however, because as 
a matter of law an owner's failure to provide notice and an opportunity to remedy the 
alleged problems defeats the claim that the owner is entitled to recover for the 
contractor's failure to remedy or repair the alleged deficiencies or defects covered by the 
warranty. See, e.g., Cinnamon Valley Resort v. EMAC Enters., Inc., 202 S.W.3d 1, 6 
(Ark. Ct. App. 2005) (recognizing that as prerequisite to asserting action for breach of 
warranty, plaintiff had burden of demonstrating that it gave notice of defects to defendant 
builder and an opportunity to cure); Pollard v. Saxe & Yolles Dev. Co., 525 P.2d 88, 92 
(Cal. 1974) (barring buyers' action for breach of implied warranty due to unreasonable 
delay in providing notice of defects to builder); Virchow v. University Homes, Inc., 699 
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N.W.2d 499, 504 (S.D. 2005) (failure of owner to give notice to manufacturer that 
windows leaked relieved manufacturer of liability under warranty). After all, "a 
warrantor cannot be expected to fix problems of which it has no notice." Virchow, 699 
N.W.2d at 504. 
The undisputed testimony in this case establishes that the Bells never requested 
Stonecreek to repair, replace or remedy any of its work, that they never gave Stonecreek 
a punch list of items to fix, and that they never even notified or made any demand to 
Stonecreek prior to filing their counterclaim in this litigation for any alleged defective 
workmanship, plants, other materials, or anything else. (R. at 405: 35, 71-72, 140, 146; 
R. at 406: 326, 335). Mr. Davis, Stonecreek's sprinkler subcontractor, testified that the 
Bells never complained to him about the quality of work on the sprinkler system and 
never requested that he repair any sprinkler problems. (R. at 406: 351). Similarly, Mr. 
Higley, Stonecreek's subcontractor who built the water feature, testified that the Bells 
told him that they were happy with the water feature and that it turned out well. (R. at 
406: 370). The Bells did not show, and indeed cannot show, that they gave Stonecreek 
notice of the alleged deficiencies and an opportunity to fix them, even assuming 
arguendo that Cottonwood's work was done to "remedy" alleged deficiencies. 
Thus, even if the Bells' claimed defects existed and were caused by Stonecreek 
(all of which Stonecreek denies), the Bells would not be entitled to any offset as a matter 
of law. The Bells cannot have an offset for alleged deficiencies in Stonecreek's work of 
which they gave Stonecreek no notice and no opportunity to fix. The Bells' failure to 
provide such notice and opportunity to cure waived any arguable right of offset as a 
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matter of law. See, e.g., Becksteadv, Deseret Roofing Co., 831 P.2d 130, 133 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1992) ("The question of whether a right has been waived has been characterized as 
one of fact ... although it is perhaps more accurate to view the ultimate conclusion 
whether waiver has occurred, given particular facts, as a question of law.'") (quoting B.R. 
WoodwardMktg, Inc. v. Collins FoodServ., Inc., 754 P.2d 99, 101 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) 
(citation omitted)); see also Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-605 (2006) (requiring buyer of 
goods to give seller seasonable notice of defects and opportunity to cure as prerequisite to 
asserting breach of contract based on such defects). 
The trial court found that the "fact that the Bells did not request Stonecreek to 
remedy the defects was due in large part because Stonecreek left the job before its 
completion." (R. at 370). As discussed above, this is not the legal standard. It does, 
however, confirm that the Bells did not notify Stonecreek of alleged defects or ask 
Stonecreek to remedy them. Having never provided any notice or opportunity to 
Stonecreek to remedy alleged deficiencies, as a matter of law the Bells are not entitled to 
the $7,000 offset the trial court awarded them, and this Court should reverse the offset 
award. 
II. STONECREEK IS ENTITLED TO RECEIVE THE VALUE OF THE SERVICES 
IT RENDERED ON THE PROPERTY AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
The Bells repeatedly argue that because the trial court found that Stonecreek 
breached the contract, Stonecreek is not entitled to an award for the value of services it 
rendered. In fact, however, the trial court found that both parties breached the contract, 
including the Bells on the very day the contract was entered into, a fact the Bells 
improperly brush past. But the trial court granted judgment to Stonecreek, because 
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ultimately it found that Stonecreek's work improved the Property and that the Bells 
benefited from that work without fully paying for it. (See R. 370-71). Utah's mechanics' 
lien statute expressly provides that a contractor is entitled to recover the "value of the 
service rendered, labor performed, or materials or equipment furnished...." Utah Code § 
38-1-3 (2004) (emphasis added). The trial court therefore erred in essentially capping 
Stonecreek's recovery by its calculation of damages using the $30,000 contract price as 
the starting point and deducting various items from it (particularly in light of the evidence 
of mutual breach and of multiple and repeated changes to the project and the parties' 
agreement over time). 
The trial court also erred in disregarding Mr. Bells' admission that he had $96,000 
worth of landscaping on his Property. (R. at 405: 140-41, 185; R. at 406: 240-41, 270, 
284, 299, 336, 365-66; see also Stonecreek's marshaling section of its initial brief to this 
court, at pp. 27-29). Mr. Bells' admission goes directly to the value of landscaping on his 
Property, including the value of Stonecreek's work, and is a statement against his own 
interest that Stonecreek is not required to prove any further than such admission. Utah R. 
Evid. 803(b)(3). Additionally, Mr. Bell never disputed at trial that he told Randy 
Waddoups that he had spent $45,000 on the rock work. (R. at 406: 240; 335-36). 
Using Mr. Bells' own figures, the value of Stonecreek's work was at least $37,700 
(as detailed more fully in Stonecreek's prior brief to this Court: $96,000 - $45,000 -
$12,500 - $800 = $37,700), which approximates the amounts that Mr. Bell admitted other 
contractors bid to do the same work (i.e., from $32,000 to $37,000). (R. at 364; 406: 241, 
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309). Stonecreek is entitled to rely on the figures provided by the Bells themselves to 
prove the value of Stonecreek's work, including in light of the Bells' testimony admitting 
that all of the landscaping Stonecreek did is still on the Property. (R. at 406: 300-05, 
310-11; see also Stonecreek's marshaling section of its initial brief to this court, at p. 28). 
Since the value of Stonecreek's services provides the proper measure for recovery, 
and since the value of such services by the Bells' own admissions is $7,700 higher than 
the $30,000 contract price used by the trial court, even if the Bells were entitled to the 
$7,000 offset awarded by the trial court (which Stonecreek denies), this Court should 
increase the principal award to Stonecreek by at least $7,700. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN SUA SPONTE 
REDUCING STONECREEK'S ATTORNEYS' FEES WHERE 
STONECREEK WAS THE SUCCESSFUL PARTY AND THE 
REASONABLENESS OF THE FEES WAS NOT CHALLENGED. 
The trial court correctly found that Stonecreek was the "successful party" for 
purposes of awarding recovery of attorneys' fees. But the trial court abused its discretion 
when it thereafter failed to award Stonecreek all of its reasonable attorneys' fees incurred 
in successfully prosecuting its mechanics' lien claim and defending against the Bells" 
inextricably intertwined counterclaims where there was no challenge to the amount of 
fees incurred and claimed by Stonecreek. Awarding attorneys' fees pursuant to the 
mechanics' lien statute, Section 38-1-18 of the Utah Code Annotated, is a two-step 
process. The trial court must first determine who is the "successful party" under the 
"flexible and reasoned approach" discussed in A.K. & R. Plumbing & Heating v. Guy, 
2004 UT 47, 94 P.3d 270. The court must then award the successful party its reasonable 
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attorneys' fees. Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18 (("[I]in any action brought to enforce any lien 
under this chapter the successful party shall be entitled to recover a reasonable attorneys' 
fee....") (emphasis added)). If there is no challenge made to the reasonableness of the 
successful party's fees, then the court cannot sua sponte reduce the fee award from the 
fees claimed unless it makes certain findings based on factors set forth by this Court and 
by the Utah Supreme Court justifying the sua sponte reduction. See e.g., Govert Copier 
Painting v. Van Leeuwen, 801 P.2d 163, 173 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Martindale v. Adams, 
111 P.2d 514, 518 (Utah 1989). If the trial court does not provide such analysis and "an 
explanation for the reduction of attorney fees requested in a case where there is adequate 
and uncontroverted evidence in the record to support the fees, it abuses its discretion." 
Brown v. DavidK. Richards & Co., 978 P.2d 470, 474 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) (citing 
Regional Sales Agency, Inc. v. Reichert, 784 P.2d 1210, 1216 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); 
Martindale, 111 P.2d at 518; and Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 987-91 
(Utah 1988)). 
In the case at bar, the trial court correctly found that Stonecreek was the successful 
party.1 The trial court abused its discretion, however, when it sua sponte reduced 
1
 The Bells' arguments in their opposition brief to the contrary are simply incorrect, 
unsupportable, and fail to address the "successful party" and "flexible and reasoned 
approach" analyses set forth in Stonecreek's initial brief to this Court. (See, e.g., 
Stonecreek's Br. at 34-37). By this reference, Stonecreek incorporates as if fully set forth 
herein forth herein all of that analysis from its initial brief, showing Stonecreek is the 
successful party because, in addition to prevailing on its claim for a money judgment 
against the Bells and to foreclose its mechanics' lien, it also defeated the majority of the 
Bells' claims for offsets, defeated entirely the Bells' claims of fraudulent inducement and 
9 
Stonecreek's attorneys' fees, awarding Stonecreek less than one-third of its $28,358 in 
fees and costs incurred, without conducting the required analysis of the reasonableness of 
the requested fees. Specifically, this Court has held that in determining what constitutes a 
reasonable fee, a court may reduce the amount requested only after expressly considering 
such factors as: 
"the difficulty of the litigation, the efficiency of the attorneys in presenting 
the case, the reasonableness of the number of hours spent on the case, the 
fee customarily charged in the locality for similar services, the amount 
involved in the case and the result obtained, and the expertise and 
experience of the attorneys involved." 
Govert, 801 P.2d at 174 (quoting Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622, 625 (Utah 1985)). 
This Court has further held that that the trial court is required to make findings 
explaining, based on those factors, why it reduced the attorneys' fees requested, or the fee 
reduction constitutes an abuse of discretion. Brown, 978 P.2d at 474. 
Govert and Brown are instructive because in both cases the trial courts gave short 
explanations for why they reduced the successful parties' attorneys' fees, but were still 
held to have abused their discretion because their explanations did not use or analyze the 
factors the appellate courts have identified as relevant to considering such requests. In 
Brown, a seller of corporate assets sought to enforce a purchase agreement against the 
buyer, and the buyer counterclaimed for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, breach of 
warranty, and breach of fiduciary duty. 978 P.2d at 472-73. The buyer prevailed at trial 
and sought to recover $540,000 in attorneys' fees. Id. at 474. In considering the request, 
abuse of lien rights, and successfully established the priority of its mechanics' lien over 
the trust deed lien of Defendant America First Credit Union. 
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the trial court found that the rates charged and time expended were reasonable, but 
nonetheless reduced the attorneys' fees requested to $218,986.42. Id. In so doing, the 
trial court stated only that "'thirty-five percent of the total time expended through trial 
[i.e., the approximate time spent on the breach of warranty claim]' would be more 
reasonable." Id. On appeal, this Court reversed and remanded with instructions for the 
entry of an award to the buyer for all of his fees of $540,000, noting that "the trial court 
made no findings whatsoever as to why it reduced the attorney fees requested." Id. 
Likewise, in Govert, the trial court reduced an attorneys' fee award from 
$1,387.50 to a nominal $100 and explained that it was doing so '"based on the merits of 
this case and the fact that defendant has received considerable amount of services for 
practically nothing, I guess, except attorney[']s fees.'" 801 P.2d at 174. On appeal, this 
Court reversed and awarded all of the requested fees because the trial court "did not 
utilize the factors established by appellate courts as relevant to a reduction in fees." Id. 
In this case, the Bells did not challenge the reasonableness of Stonecreek's 
attorneys' fees, nor did the trial court find that they were unreasonable or excessive in 
any way. Nonetheless, as in Brown and Govert, the trial court simply unilaterally 
reduced Stonecreek's requested attorneys' fees by more than two-thirds without 
analyzing any of the factors required by this Court. The trial court thus abused its 
discretion when it reduced the successful party Stonecreek's attorneys' fees from $28,358 
to $8,436. That reduction should be reversed and Stonecreek should be awarded all of its 
reasonable attorneys' fees, including those incurred on appeal. R.A. McKell Excavating, 
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Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2004 UT 48, ^ 24, 100 P.3d 1159 (successful party on 
appeal in mechanics' lien case entitled to recover fees on appeal). 
Although the trial court did not attempt to determine the reasonableness of 
Stonecreek's attorneys' fees, an analysis of those fees using the factors set forth by this 
Court in Govert confirms that they are in fact reasonable. The total fees incurred, from 
the initial preparation of the notice of the mechanics' lien all the way to the fee affidavit 
following the trial was only $28,358. That is a very reasonable sum considering the 
amount of work Stonecreek's counsel had to perform to successfully perfect and pursue 
Stonecreek's claims and defend against the Bells' counterclaims through nearly two years 
of litigation and a trial. There was written discovery conducted by Stonecreek and a trial 
brief and proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law researched and drafted. 
Stonecreek successfully argued at the final pretrial conference for the exclusion of two 
defense witnesses. The trial, originally scheduled for one day, ultimately took one full 
day and two partial days, and eight witnesses were prepared and called to testify. 
As detailed in Stonecreek's fee affidavit (a copy of which is attached hereto as 
"Addendum No. 1"), all of the work performed by Fabian & Clendenin was necessary to 
successfully prosecute Stonecreek's claims and defend against the Bells' counterclaims. 
(R. at 207). In addition, the rates charged by Fabian & Clendenin were reasonable, 
particularly in light of the respective skill levels and expertise and the division of labor 
among attorneys and paralegals working for Stonecreek and the rates charged in the Salt 
Lake City area for comparable legal services. (R. at 206-07). The attorneys' billable 
hour rates ranged from $115 to $255 per hour, with most of the work being performed by 
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Bradley L. Tilt, an experienced real estate litigator with a billing rate of $195 per hour. 
(R. at 204-07). 
In light of all of these factors, there simply is no basis under the precedents of this 
Court for any reduction of the unchallenged and reasonable fees incurred by Stonecreek. 
Stonecreek is therefore entitled to recover all of its attorneys' fees in the amount of 
$28,358, and this Court should enter a ruling granting Stonecreek recovery of all of its 
attorneys' fees. 
Important policy considerations underlying the mechanics' lien statutes further 
dictate that Stonecreek should recover all of its reasonably incurred attorneys' fees. By 
awarding Stonecreek only a fraction of its attorneys' fees, the trial court abused its 
discretion by failing to follow the appellate courts' general policy of construing the 
mechanics' lien statutes broadly to protect those who, like Stonecreek, enhance the value 
of property by supplying labor or materials. See, e.g., First Gen. Servs. v. Perkins, 918 
P.2d 480, 486 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). Contractors, including particularly small contractors 
such as Stonecreek, are not protected if they prevail on their mechanics' lien claim but 
suffer a net loss because they cannot recover all of the attorneys' fees and costs that they 
have legitimately and necessarily expended to achieve that result. Small contractors, 
especially, should therefore be able to expect to recover all of their reasonable attorneys' 
fees incurred in successfully prosecuting mechanics' lien claims because they are more 
likely to take on small jobs where the principal amount owed will often be less than the 
reasonably incurred attorneys' fees through trial. See, e.g., Dixie State Bank, 764 P.2d at 
990 ("It is a simple fact in a lawyer's life that it takes about the same amount of time to 
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collect a note in the amount of $1,000 as it takes to collect a note for $100,000."); 
Cabrera, 69A P.2d at 625 (stating that an attorneys' fee award "cannot be said to be 
unreasonable just because it is greater than the amount recovered on the contract. The 
amount of damages awarded in a case does not place a necessary limit on the amount of 
attorney fees that can be awarded."). In addition, small contractors are less likely to be 
able to afford and absorb the costs of the litigation if they are not awarded the full amount 
of their reasonably incurred attorneys' fees and costs, even when they succeed on the 
merits in mechanics' lien litigation to enforce their rights. 
The fee reduction in this case is a starkly inequitable result. Despite being the 
successful party at trial, in light of the trial court's sua sponte fee award reduction 
Stonecreek suffered a net loss of more than $15,000. Such a result is simply unfair and 
frustrates the purpose of the mechanics' lien statutes to protect-contractors who enhance 
the value of homeowners' property with labor or services. This Court therefore should 
reverse the trial court and award to Stonecreek all of its attorneys' fees incurred. 
IV. STONECREEK WAS NOT REQUIRED TO SEGREGATE ITS FEES 
BECAUSE ALL OF ITS CLAIMS AND DEFENSES ARE INEXTRICABLY 
INTERTWINED. 
The Bells' argument that Stonecreek is not entitled to its attorneys' fees because it 
did not separate compensable and typically noncompensable claims is without merit and 
ignores controlling case law on point and cited in Stonecreek's initial brief: First General 
Services v. Perkins, 918 P.2d 480 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). In First General, a 
subcontractor sought to foreclose a mechanics' lien against a homeowner, and the 
homeowner counterclaimed alleging negligent workmanship. Id. at 483. The 
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subcontractor prevailed and sought recovery of its fees incurred in both the foreclosure of 
its lien and its defense against the homeowner's counterclaim. Id. The court held that the 
subcontractor was entitled to fees both in pursuing its affirmative claims and in 
defending against the counterclaim, because the two were inextricably tied together. Id. 
In so holding, the court recognized that where the proof of a compensable claim and an 
otherwise noncompensable claim are closely related and require proof of the same facts, 
a successful party is entitled to recover its fees incurred in proving all of the related facts 
on both of the claims: 
the successful defense of counterclaims which would otherwise defeat the 
principal lien claim, in whole or in part, must necessarily be considered for 
the purpose of awarding attorney fees under the mechanics' lien statute. 
Logically, a lien holder must defend against such claims in order to 
"enforce" the lien. 
Id at 486. 
Like First General, Stonecreek's defense of the Bells' counterclaims, and 
Stonecreek's lien priority claim against America First, all were inextricably intertwined 
with Stonecreek's mechanics' lien claim. In order to enforce its mechanics' lien, 
Stonecreek had to defend against the Bells' claims of negligent workmanship, and 
establish the priority of its mechanics' lien over America First's lien, all of which 
2
 Utah's mechanics' lien statutes specifically contemplate the lien priority issue as being 
a part of the lien claim. See Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-5 (2004) (stating that mechanics' 
liens have "priority over any lien, mortgage or other encumbrance which may have 
attached subsequently to the time when the building, improvement or structure was 
commenced, work begun, or first material furnished on the ground."). Indeed, at the 
heart of every lien foreclosure case is the issue of the lien being foreclosed over other 
claimants' liens. Because Stonecreek was required to establish the priority of its lien as 
against America First in order to foreclose as against America First, it is entitled to 
recover its attorneys' fees incurred in successfully proving that priority and it was a 
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required Stonecreek to prove the same set of facts. There was thus no need, nor any 
basis, for Stonecreek to segregate its fees incurred among the various claims at issue. 
V. STONECREEK SHOULD BE AWARDED ALL OF ITS COSTS. 
Stonecreek properly claims and is entitled to recover $2,545.04 for its costs 
incurred in this matter. Under Utah law, "'the trial court can exercise reasonable 
discretion in regard to the allowance of costs; and [] it has a duty to guard against any 
excesses or abuses in the taxing thereof" Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d 684, 686 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990) (quoting Hatanaka v. Struhs, 738 P.2d 1052, 1055 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) 
(citation omitted)). 
Stonecreek should be awarded all of its costs because that is the only result that is 
consistent with the appellate courts' general policy of construing the mechanics' lien 
statutes broadly to protect those who, like Stonecreek, enhance the value of property by 
supplying labor or materials. See First Gen., 918 P.2d at 486. Awarding Stonecreek less 
than all of its costs is inconsistent with the purpose behind the mechanics' lien statute, 
and can particularly harm small contractors like Stonecreek where the costs incurred to 
successfully enforce their rights can substantially dissipate the already narrow profits on 
the small principal amounts owed to them. 
further abuse of discretion (that this Court should reverse) for the trial court not to award 
fees for that portion of Stonecreek's case. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the $7,000 offset awarded to the Bells as lacking 
evidentiary foundation and, in any event, as a matter of law for the Bells' failure to give 
Stonecreek any notice of and opportunity to cure any claimed defects. 
This Court should also reverse, as an abuse of discretion, the trial court's sua 
sponte reduction of attorneys' fees awarded to Stonecreek, and award to Stonecreek the 
full amount of its reasonable attorneys' fees and costs, including those incurred on 
appeal, for successfully prosecuting its rights and claims, including under Utah's 
mechanics' lien statutes. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 20th day of February, 2007. 
W. Andeps/efn 
Bradley L. Tilt 
Fabian & Cle#8enin, PC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff, Counterclaim 
Defendant, Appellee/Cross-Appellant 
Stonecreek Landscaping, L.L.C. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF 
OF APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT STONECREEK LANDSCAPING, L.L.C, 
were mailed by first-class mail with postage fully prepaid this 20th day of February, 
2007, to: 
Shawn D. Turner 
Larson, Turner, Fairbanks & Dalby 
1218 West South Jordan Parkway, Ste B 
South Jordan, UT 84095 
Attorneys for Travis Bell and Sunrise Bell 
Timothy W. Blackburn 
VanCott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy 
2404 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Attorneys for America First Credit Union 
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FILED 
I J MAR 3 1 2006 
I SECOND 
i DISTRICT COURT 
Daniel W. Anderson, A0080 
Bradley L. Tilt, A7649 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, 
A Professional Corporation 
Twelfth Floor 
215 South State Street 
P.O. Box 510210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151 
Telephone: (801)531-8900 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STONE CREEK LANDSCAPING, L.L.C, 
a Utah limited liability company, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TRAVIS BELL; SUNRISE BELL; 
AMERICA FIRST CREDIT UNION, a 
Utah corporation; and JOHN DOES 1-10, 
Defendants. 
TRAVIS & SUNRISE BELL, 
Counter Claim Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
STONE CREEK LANDSCAPING, L.L.C, 
a Utah Limited Liability Company; and 
RANDY WADDOUPS, 
Counter Claim Defendants. 
VD18945622 
ATTORNEY FEE AFFIDAVIT 
Civil No. 040700430 
Judge Darwin C. Hansen 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
BRADLEY L. TILT, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as 
follows pursuant to Rule 73 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
1. I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Utah, and a 
shareholder in the professional corporation of Fabian & Clendenin. 
2. I am personally familiar with the above-entitled action, and am the main 
attorney who represented Plaintiff in the above-cap tioned case, including without limitation at 
trial. 
3. The legal bases for an award of attorney fees to Plaintiff in this action are: 
a. Section 38-1-18 of the Utah Code, which provides that "in any 
action brought to enforce any lien under this chapter [Utah's mechanics' lien act] the 
successful party shall be entitled to recover a reasonable attorneys' fee, to be fixed by the 
court, which shall be taxed as costs in the action." Part of Plaintiff s claims in this case 
include foreclosure of a mechanics' lien under Utah's mechanics' lien act of which Utah 
Code Section 38-1-18 is apart. 
b. Section 78-27-56 of the Utah Code, which provides that "[i]n civil 
actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing party if the court 
determines that the action or defense to the action was without merit and not brought or 
asserted in good faith," subject only to certain exceptions that do not apply here. As 
shown more fully in Plaintiffs Trial Brief and the evidence and arguments presented at 
the trial of this case, the defenses and counterclaims of Defendants Travis Bell and 
Sunrise Bell (collectively, the "Bells") are without merit and were not brought or asserted 
in good faith. 
4. The nature of the work performed by myself and other attorneys in the law 
firm of Fabian & Clendenin, P.C. has included, over the past approximately 22 months, among 
other things and without limitation: preparing and recording a mechanics' lien notice; preparing 
and filing a complaint initiating the above-captioned action; preparing and recording a lis pendens 
regarding the above-captioned action; acting as legal counsel of record for Plaintiff in the above-
captioned action; preparing and filing a reply to a counterclaim of the Defendants Bells; 
telephone conferences with and drafting letters to Plaintiff; telephone conferences with and 
drafting letters to legal counsel for Defendants Bells and legal counsel of record for Defendant 
America First Credit Union; preparing and circulating proposed scheduling orders and discovery 
plans; reviewing documents received from Plaintiff; reviewing documents received from each of 
the respective Defendants; attending various hearings, including telephonically and in person; 
drafting requests for discovery; reviewing written discovery responses; fact investigation; 
meetings with and interviews of witnesses; preparing and issuing trial subpoenas; drafting pretrial 
disclosures; conducting legal research; drafting a trial brief; drafting proposed findings of fact and 
conclusions of law; drafting proposed order and judgment; reviewing trial briefs and proposed 
findings and conclusions of other parties' legal counsel of record; preparing for and attending one 
and one half (1 Vi) days so far of trial; preparing closing arguments for trial. 
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5. My normal and usual billing rate for such services rendered is, and at all 
times during my involvement in and on the above-captioned case has been, $195.00 per hour. I 
have spent the sum of 82.4 hours in the above-entitled action through and including March 29, 
2006. I have been an attorney licensed to practice in Utah since 1996, and I have since then 
practiced primarily in the areas of real estate law and litigation, including specifically, but 
without limitation, mechanics' lien litigation such as that which is the subject of the above-
captioned case. The work I have performed for Plaintiff in the above-entitled action has included, 
without limitation, acting as lead counsel of record for Plaintiff since November, 2005, including: 
telephone conferences with and drafting letters to Plaintiff; telephone conferences with and 
drafting letters to legal counsel for Defendants Bells and legal counsel of record for Defendant 
America First Credit Union; reviewing documents received from Plaintiff; reviewing documents 
received from each of the respective Defendants; attending a telephonic scheduling hearing; 
attending an in-court pretrial conference; meetings with and interviews of party witnesses; 
drafting pretrial disclosures; drafting a trial brief; drafting proposed findings of fact and 
conclusions of law; drafting proposed order and judgment; reviewing trial briefs and proposed 
findings and conclusions of other parties' legal counsel of record; and preparing for and attending 
one and one half (154) days so far of trial. 
6. Other attorneys in the law firm of Fabian & Clendenin, P.C. who have 
worked for Plaintiff on in connection with the above-captioned action are: 
a. Daniel W. Anderson, whose normal and usual billing rate up to and 
including July 31, 2004, was $225.00 per hour, from August 1, 2004, to July 31, 2005, 
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was $245.00 per hour, and from August 1, 2005, to the present was and is $255.00 per 
hour. Mr. Anderson has spent the sum of 11.75 hours in the above-entitled action through 
and including March 29, 2006. Mr. Anderson has been an attorney licensed to practice in 
Utah since 1979, including with considerable experience in the field of real estate law, 
general litigation, and litigation relating to real estate in particular, including mechanics' 
liens litigation like that at issue in this case. The work Mr. Anderson has performed for 
Plaintiff in the above-entitled action has included, without limitation: preparing and 
recording a mechanics' lien notice; preparing and filing a complaint initiating the above-
captioned action; preparing and recording a lis pendens regarding the above-captioned 
action; preparing and filing a reply to a counterclaim of the Defendants Bells; telephone 
conferences with and drafting letters to Plaintiff; telephone conferences with and drafting 
letters to legal counsel for Defendants Bells and legal counsel of record for Defendant 
America First Credit Union; preparing and circulating proposed scheduling orders and 
discovery plans; reviewing documents received from Plaintiff; reviewing documents 
received from each of the respective Defendants; attending various telephonic hearings; 
drafting initial disclosures; reviewing written discovery responses from Defendants Bells, 
and drafting correspondence to legal counsel for the Bells regarding the same. 
b. Sara E. Bouley, whose normal and usual billing rate during the 
time she performed work on the above-captioned case was, and is, $180.00 per hour. 
Mrs. Bouley has spent the sum of 23.6 hours in the above-entitled action. Mrs. Bouley 
has been an attorney licensed to practice in Utah since 1997, and practices primarily in 
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the areas of real estate law and litigation. The work that Mrs. Bouley has performed for 
Plaintiff in the above-captioned action has included, without limitation: fact investigation; 
interviews of non-party witnesses; preparing and issuing trial subpoenas; and conducting 
legal research. 
c. Felicia B. Canfield, whose normal and usual billing rate up to and 
including July 31, 2004, was $115.00 per hour, and from August 1, 2005, throughout the 
remainder of the time in which she performed work on the above-captioned case was 
$140.00 per hour. Mrs. Canfield has spent the sum of 7.45 hours in the above-entitled 
action. Mrs. Canfield has been an attorney licensed to practice in Utah since 2002, and 
practices primarily in the areas of real estate law and civil litigation. The work that Mrs. 
Canfield has performed for Plaintiff in the above-captioned action has included, without 
limitation: reviewing documents received from Plaintiff; and drafting requests for 
admissions, interrogatories, and requests for production of documents to Defendants 
Bells. 
7. 0.5 hours have been spent on the above-entitled action by a paralegal 
employed with the law firm of Fabian & Clendenin, assisting in locating addresses for pretrial 
disclosures and for service of trial subpoenas. That paralegal's normal and usual billing rate at 
the time she performed work in the above-entitled action was $110.00 per hour. 
8. The sum of $23,015.14 is a reasonable amount of attorney fees to be 
awarded to Plaintiff in this matter for services rendered through and including March 29, 2006, 
and I affirm the reasonableness of such fees for comparable legal services to those provided to 
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Plaintiff in this case, including particularly, but without limitation, in light of the factors 
referenced hereinabove as to the division of labor that has been done among the attorneys 
working on this matter and their respective levels of experience, ability, and expertise, and in 
light of the nature and number of the claims at issue in this case, the low number of total hours 
involved and the efficiency involved to take the case all the way from initial pleadings phase 
through and including the trial. 
9. I reasonably expect that it will require considerable additional work to 
collect Plaintiff s judgment in the above-entitled matter, and reserve the right to augment and 
update this attorney fee affidavit to include all attorney fees and costs incurred by Plaintiff in 
connection with the above-captioned action from and after March 30, 2006, 
10. To my knowledge costs and disbursements totaling $1,793.78 as reflected 
on the attached sheets are correct and have been necessarily incurred in this action. There may be 
costs that have been incurred for Plaintiff in connection with the above-captioned action that have 
not yet posted to and do not yet show on the attached sheets. I also reasonably expect that it will 
require considerable additional expense to collect Plaintiff s judgment in the above-captioned 
matter, and reserve the right to augment and update this affidavit to include all attorney expenses 
and costs incurred by Plaintiff in connection with the above-captioned action as may hereafter be 
shown. 
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DATED th is^g^day of March, 2006. 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, P.C. 
BVsSley L. Ti} 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this BO' day of March, 2006, 
by Bradley L. Tilt. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
JENNIFER L DUSTiN 
M5 S State St Ste 1200 
)|f Salt Lake City Utah 81111 
fy My Commission Expires 
Fohruprv 10 2009 
STATE OF fTTAH 
rAB^imf lU2_> U*f NOT R^UB^IC 
Residing at: Sal-h LglCe Coonhn .JJ-f-gh 
-H-
My Commission Expires: 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing PLAINTIFF'S 
TRIAL BRIEF was mailed, first class mail, postage prepaid, this^s^-tterrrrfMarch, 2006, to: 
Shawn D. Turner 
Larson, Turner, Fairbanks & Dalby 
1218 West South Jordan Parkway, Suite B 
South Jordan, UT 84095 
*and by telefax to 254-0303 
Timothy W. Blackburn 
VanCott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy 
2404 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
*and by telefax to (801) 627-2522 
^3~ 
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Date Disbursement Description Amount 
08-04-04 Foreclosure Report; Forclosure report 
(Waddoups/Randy)/ Founders Title Company 250.00 
08-20-04 Filing Fees; filing fee to file complaint; 
Second District Court, Davis County 155.00 
08-20-04 Recording Fees; Recording fee to record Lis 
Pendens; Davis County Recorder 12.00 
08-27-04 Service of Summons, Processors, etc.; 
served American First Credit Union; 
Anderson Process Services, L.C. 87.00 
09-03-04 Service of Summons, Processors, etc.; 
Service of Process on Travis Bell; Anderson 
Process Services, L.C. 48.00 
09-03-04 Service of Summons, Processors, etc.; 
Service of Process on Sunrise Bell; 
Anderson Process Services, L.C. 6.00 
06-10-05 Outside Copying Costs; Color copies; 
DataCopy, LLC 12.7 9 
11-22-05 Filing Fees; Filing fee for Application for 
Reinstatement; State of Utah 52.00 
11-22-05 Filing Fees; Filing fee for Application for 
Reinstatement; State of Utah <52.00> 
11-23-05 Certified Copies; Certified copies; State 
of Utah 87.60 
11-23-05 Filing Fees; Custodian of Records -
Stonecreek Landscaping; Division of 
Occupational and 20.00 
01-19-06 Certified Copies; Certified copy of 
Certificate of Existence; State of Utah 12.00 
01-19-06 Certified Copies; Stonecreek Landscaping 
Custodian of Records; Division of 
Occupational and 20.00 
02-22-06 Outside Copying Costs; Document copies, 
Bates labeling, oversize and color copies; 
DataCopy, LLC 234.69 
02-22-06 Witness Fee/Expenses; Witness fee; Shane 
D a v i s
 18.50 
02-22-06 Witness Fee/Expenses; Witness fee; Arden 
Godwin 18.50 
02-24-06 Witness Fee/Expenses; Wilness fee; Jon Higley 18.50 
Copying Expenses 114.30 
Fax Charges 1.24 
Postage 18.74 
On-line Research 14.56 
Long Distance Telephone - In State 1.40 
Long Distance Telephone - Out of State 1.60 




































































Travel Expenses; Mileage to pretrial conference in Farmington; 
Bradley L. Tilt 
Copying Expenses 
Service of Summons, Processors, etc.; Service of process for Shane 
Davis; Anderson Process Services, L.C. 
Service of Summons, Processors, etc.; Service of process for Arden 
Godwin; Anderson Process Services, L.C. 
Copying Expenses 
Copying Expenses 
Witness Fee/Expenses; Witness fee; Jon Higley 
Witness Fee/Expenses; Witness fee; Arden Godwin 
Witness Fee/Expenses; Witness fee; Shane Davis 
Witness Fee/Expenses; Witness fee; Dan Cloward 




Service of Summons, Processors, etc.; Service of subpoena on Jon 
Higley; Anderson Process Services, L.C. 
Service of Summons, Processors, etc.; Service of subpoena on Dan 
Cloward; Anderson Process Services, L.C. 
Service of Summons, Processors, etc.; Service of subpoena on 
Cottonwood Landscapes, LLC; Anderson Process Services, L.C. 







Outside Copying Costs; Color copies; DataCopy, LLC 
Certified Copies; Certified copies; Davis County Recorder 











Copying Expenses • 
Outside Copying Costs; Color copies; DataCopy, LLC 
Postage; 3/29/06 
Outside Copying Costs; Color and oversize copies; DataCopy, LLC 
Service of Summons, Processors, etc.; Process service of Subpoena 
for trial to Dan Cloward; Anderson Process Services, L.C. 
Service of Summons, Processors, etc.; Process service of Subpoena 
for trial to Arden Godwin; Anderson Process Services, L.C. 
Service of Summons, Processors, etc.; Process service of Subpoena 
for trial to Jon Higley; Anderson Process Services, L.C. 
Service of Summons, Processors, etc.; Process service of Subpoena 
for trial to Shane Davis; Anderson Process Services, L.C. 
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